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'R_espondents' ·{!Jrief
I.

INTRODUCTIOIN

We agree with defendants (Brief, p. 9) that the chief
issue on this appeal is whether or not the court was right
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

in overruling defendants' demurrer to plaintiffs' petition.
That petition sets forth two causes of action, the first of
which involves the power of the school board to abandon the
Elmo school. When the trial court overruled defendants'
demurer to this first cause of action it in reality disposed
of the entire law suit. The rulings as to the second cause of
action and as to plaintiffs' demurrer to the defendants'
answer were correct but were not essential to a disposition
of the case. In other words, the trial court in its first ruling
held as a matter of law that the Emery County School Board
had no power to abandon the Elmo school. If there is no
power to abandon then the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the steps leading to the abandonment is immaterial.
The question of the use or abuse of discretion can only be
considered where there is power to act.
Plaintiffs would have been driven to rely upon their
second cause of action and to resist defendants' answer only
in the event the trial court held against them on the first
cause of action. The situation is the same on this appeal.
If this honorable court sustains the trial court in its ajudication that the Emery County School Board was without
power to close the Elmo school, there will be no purpose in
considering the allegations in plaintiffs' second cause of
action and in defendants' answer.
We shall proceed, nevertheless, to examine the authorities and answer the arguments of defendants in full. Because, however, of the existence of the two fundamental issues in this entire problem as above indicated, the one of
statutory power and the other of the use or abuse of discretion, we shall follow the theory of plaintiffs' pleadings in
our argument rather than commingle these issues.
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II. EMERY COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD WITHOUT POWER TO DISCONTINUE ELMO SCHOOL. (HEREIN
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AND
ALL SUBSEQUENT PLEADINGS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH).
Inasmuch as the board of education is a creation of the
legislature, our first problem is one of statutory construction, and in particular a construction of R. S. Utah, 1933,
75-11-20. The following authorities disclose the governing
canons with respect to the interpretation of such statutes.
School boards are sometimes denominated quasi-corporations with very limited powers. The general proposition is
clearly stated in McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 1,
Sec. 113, p. 277:
"Municipal corporations distinguished from
school districts. Boards of education or school districts rank low in the grade of corporate existence,
and, hence, are properly denominated quasi-corporations. They possess only limited powers and small
corporate life. As declared in a New Hampshire
case: 'School districts are quasi-corporations of the
most limited powers known to the law. They have
no powers derived from usage. They have the powers expressly granted to them, and such implied
powers as are necessary to enable them to perform
their duties and no more.' Likewise, in an early
Massachusetts case: 'That they are not· bodies
politic and corporate with the general power of
corporations, must be admitted; and the reasoning
advanced to show their defect of power is conclusive.' "
School districts do not possess the governmental attributes of municipalities:
"They have been held to be bodies of a lower
grade, with less power than cities, fewer of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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characteristics of private corporations, and more
of mere agencies. of the state. They possess only
the administrative powers that are granted by the
central government or inferred by necessary implication." Wilson v. School District of Philadelphia,
.•... Pa. . . . . ., 195 A. 90, 113 A. L. R. 1401, p.
1406.
The law is well stated in one of the cases cited
by defendants:
"The school district is not a municipal corporation. It is very grudgingly accorded the rank of a
quasi-municipal corporation. McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 112; 24 R. C. L. p. 564. It is but
the agent of the state for the sole purpose of administering the state's system of public education,
and has only such powers as are conferred expressly or by necessary implication." Iverson v. Union
Free High School, ..... Wis...... 202 N. W. 788
at p. 792.
Our own Supreme Court in Beard v. Board of Education,
81, Utah· 51, 16 P. (2d) 900 at page 903 has enunciated the
controlling principle as follows:
"The board of education, being a creation of
the legislature, has only such powers as are expressly conferred upon it and such implied powers
as are necessary to execute and carry into effect its
express powers."
The statutory grant of power is at once a grant and a
limitation:
"The statute granting the power must be regarded both as a grant and a limitation upon the
powers of the board." MeNair v School Dist. of Cascade County ...•. Mont......, 288, p. 189.
Moreover, any ambiguity or reasonable doubt with reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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spect to the powers claimed is to be resolved against the
grant:
"Any doubt as to the existence or possession
of a particular power, or any ambiguity in the
terms of the grant, should ordinarily be resolved
against the power and in favor of the people." 56 C.
J. 332.
The State of Utah is committed to the foregoing rule:
"It is a general rule that a municipal corporation has only such powers as are expressly granted,
or essential thereto, or plainly implied therein. I
Dill. Mun. Corp., Sec. 89, 91. And where there is a
doubt as to the existence of their authority, such
doubt is resolved against the corporation." Ogden
City v. McLaughlin, 5 Utah 387 16 P. 721.
"Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the
courts against the corporation, and the power is
denied." Quoted with approval in Salt Lake City,
v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234.
"The tendency of municipal government [and
we interpolate-of school boards] to arrogate to itself power, and to encroach upon the right of its
citizens, has led to the establishment of salutary
rules of construction, limiting their powers to those
expressly granted or arising by reasonable and necessary implication from the grant." Quoted with
approval in Pettit v Duke 10 Utah 311, 37 P. 568.
See also: American Fork v Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P.
249, Lund v Salt Lal{e County, 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510.
Our Utah statutes must be interpreted in the light of
the foregoing salutary principles of construction. Wherein
is the Emery County School Board granted express or implied power to abandon and destroy the Elmo School?
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There is no express power. The defendants so confess
(Brief, p. 12).
There is no implied power.

General powers of school

boards are defined in R. S. Utah, 1933, 75-11-20. The section begins with the declaratio,n that "every board of education shall have power and authority to purchase and sell
schoolhouse sites and improvements thereon, to construct
and erect school buildings and to furnish the same, to establish, locate and maintain 'kindergart~n schools, common
schools consisting of primary and grammar grades, high
schools and industrial or manual training schools"; the
board may support libraries and procure necessary school
apparatus; supply books to pupils; jointly maintain and
operate one or more schools with an adjoining school district; assign students to the state school of education for
the purpose of illustrating instruction; and the section concludes with the general statement that a school board "may
do all things needful for the maintenance, prosperity and
success of the schools and the promotion of education."
This section grants to boards of education the power
to establish, locate and maintain. schools. Of course, it can
sell school house sites and improvements thereon in the
manner provided in Section 75-11-21, but the building is
only the shell and this portion of the section does not empower the discontinuance or change of the school which is
quite a different thing from the school building.
We repeat that no powers is granted in the section to
abandon and· destroy a school nor is any such power implied. Elmo school had long been in existence when the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Emery County School District was organized. The school
board merely took over the operation and maintenance of
the Elmo school in place of the old board of trustees. If the
legislature intended to grant the power claimed by defendants why did it not do so-why did it not employ the words
"relocate," "remove," "change," or "discontinue," or their
equivalent? Utah legislative history is instructive in this
connection. Section 1816 of the Compiled Laws of Utah,
1907, granted to school district boards the following power:
1816. To ntaintain, locate, or discontinue
schools. It shall organize, maintain and conveniently locate schools for the education of the children of school age within the district, or change or
discontinue any of them according to law." (Un
derscore added) .
The words in this section preceding the underscored portion, with the exception of the caption, are substantially
the same as the words in the present Utah law, namely, "to
establish, locate and maintain." But this language was
deemed to be insufficient by the Utah legislature and so
it added the underscored portion. Our legislature clearly
manifested in the writing of that section that the words
"organize, maintain and conveniently locate" did not imply
the power to discontinue or change. To "establish, locate
and maintain" is one grant; to "maintain, locate or discontinue" is quite a different power. Section 1825, Compiled
Laws of Utah 1907 went on to provide "that any school may
be discontinued when the average attendance of pupils therein for twenty consecutive days shall be less than eight, or
when \vith the consent of a majority of the patrons of such
school, proper and convenient school facilities can be proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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vided for the pupils in some other school."

This statute

was construed in the case of State ex rei. Bishop v. Morehouse et al., Trustees of Fish Springs, 38 Utah 234, 112

P~

169. Even this small statutory power to abandon has now
been withdrawn from Utah school boards. That fact is significant. The further significance of the foregoing legislative history is that our legislature well knows how to expressly grant power to a school board to dis.continue or
change a school if it chooses to delegate that power and
secondly, that it did not imply this power in the words,
"establish, locate and maintain."
The concluding part of R. S. Utah 1933, 75-11-20, that
the school board "may do all things needful for the maintenance, prosperity and success of the schools and the promotion of education" is of course to be construed in the light
of the entire section. It does not enlarge the grant. It is
a rule of statutory construction that the enumeration of certain powers in a statute followed by a grant of general powers, as in this section, is not an enlargement of the grant.
Or to state it in the reverse, the general grant at the close
of the statute is limited to the objects and purposes stated
in the first part of the statute.
Other sections of our present law are instructive as to
the legislative intent manifested in 75-11-20. Section 7511-21 provides that school boards cannot even sell the school
house or school site without the affirmative vote of twothirds of the board membership. Now the school house, as
above stated, is not the school-it is merely its shell or
envelop as is pointed out in Gollnick v Luedtke, ..... S. D.,
• . . . ., 187 N. W. 542, at p. 543. Yet under defendants'
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theory of the Utah school system our school boards can
change or discontinue a school by a bare majority vote of
the board but cannot dispose of the school shell without a
two-thirds vote. Surely this was not the intent of the legislature. A collation of the Utah statutes with reference
to district school boards refutes the contention of defendants. The Utah legislature was more concerned over the
removal of a school than the sale of a school house. It made
specific provision for the latter case; it withheld its declaration as to the former. Since the power has not been granted
to the school board it does not exist in the school board. It
rests with the legislature whether this power should be
relinquished to school boards and if so under what terms
and conditions.
And it must be remembered that if there is any substantial doubt as to the existence of the power claimed, that
doubt must be resolved in favor of the people and against
the grant.
Defendants' argument that under our existing school
laws Utah school boards are clothed with almost unlimited
power (Brief p. 12) is, in this writer's opinion, a good
statement of the sentiment of some Utah school administrators rather than a good statement of the law as set forth
in the Utah statutes above.
Nor do the cases cited by defendants sustain their
sweeping contentions. We shall review these as well as
other cases under state headings.
Utah:

Defendants first cite (Brief, p. 12), Beard v

Board of Education, supra. This is the North Summit case
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involving the power of a Board to permit a high school to
be used for extra curricular activities. The Board was upheld since such activites were declared to be educatonal.
The court cited two sections of Compiled Laws of Utah 1907,
the first, Sec. 4598, to the effect that "all public schools and
school property therein shall be under the direction and control of the board of education" and the second, Sec. 4617,
our present 75-11-20 above quoted. It thereupon makes the
statement quoted by defendants that these sections vest the
control of schools and school property in boards of education. The portion of the first statute quoted, Sec. 4598, is
no longer found in our statutes with respect to district
boards and so the ·Court's statement as to the combined
force of these two statutes is now of acedemic interest only.
Moreover, the statement when given was appropos only as
to the use of high school buildings for extra curricular activities. Anything beyond this was dicta. The case of
State ex rei. Bishop v. Morehouse et al, supra, was handed
down at a time when school boards were given power under
specified conditions to remove a school. That statute has
also been repealed.
Although numerous Utah school cases have been recorded, we have been unable to find one involving the issue
raised by this appeal. All of the Utah cases, however, stand
for the proposition that school boards have only the express
powers conferred by statute and such implied powers as are
necessary to carry the express powers into effect.
Montana: Compare the Utah statute with the statute
in the case of State v. Desonia, 215 P. 220, (App. Brief, p.
13). Section 1010 provides:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"That the trustees of any school district in the
state of Montana when they shall dee-m it for the
best interest of all pupils residing within such district, may close their school and send pupils of the
district to another district." p. 221.
The Montana legislature, unlike Utah, thereby expressly
vested power and discretion in its school trustees to discontinue schools. This case is not, therefore, authoritative for
defendants because of the total dissimilarity of the respective statutes. See also Nichols v. School Dist., No. 3 of Ravalli County, et al., 287 P. 624, where the- statute provided
that school sites. should not be sold or located by the school
board except upon the direction of a majority of the electors of the district. MeNair v School District of Cascade
County, has been cited supra for its relevant pronouncement.
Oregon:

In McBee v. School District 96 P. (2d) 207,

cited by defendants (Brief, p. 15) the statute contains an
express grant of power:
"It shall require a vote of two-thirds of the
voters present and voting at such meeting to order
the removal of the school house." p. 210.
This statute and the one construed in Lumijarvi et al v.
School Dist. No. 25 of Columbia County, et al., 229 _P. 684
are wholly unlike the Utah statutes.
Kansas:

In Mathews v. Rural High School Dist. No. 5

of Johnson and Miami Counties et al., 242 P. 1016, the
statutes provide that the establishing of high school districts and the locating of high schools are to be determined
by vote of the electors.
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California:

California allows school boards to change

schools in incorporated cities and towns but not elsewhere
except upon the vote of two-thirds of the qualified electors
of the district. Lawson v. Turlock Union lligh School District et al., 190 P. 1055.

When the Utah legislature gets

ready to further legislate upon this subject it may choose to
grant different powers to city school boards than to county
school boards. Conditions in Salt Lake City and in sparsely
settled Emery County are unlike. Indeed, it may be that
our legislature already has made a distinction along these
lines in the enactment of R. S .. Utah, 1933, 75-9-5, which
provides, pursuant to Article X, Section 6 of our state constitution, that the public school system in cities of the first
and second -class shall be. controlled by the Board of education of such cities. There is no similar grant to other boards
of education in Utah. The California court in upholding
the constitutionality of their statute requiring a vote of the.
electors for a removal in country districts and not in urban
centers, states as follows:
"In the country, a removal to a new location,
miles distant from a former site might inconvenience large numbers of pupils, while, ordinarily, the
greatest possible removal within a city could not
greatly inconvenience anyone. In the country, serious or dangerous obstacles to travel, even though
the removal be for only a short distance, might
operate to deny the benefits of the school to many
persons, while such a result is scarcely possible in a
city." p. 1056.
Nebraska:

So in Nebraska two systems of adminis-

tration prevailed-one as to urban and one as to rural school
districts. In the former the board had ultimate control as
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to the removal of schools, whereas in the latter the electors
had ultimate control. The statute as to the former provides that the "affairs of the school district shall be conducted exclusively by boards of education," and the court
held that when a provisio to this section allowing a referendum on the decisions of the board was repealed that the
board then had plenary authority. Gaddis v. School District
139 N. W. 280. This case, cited by defendants (Brief, p. 19),
is really an authority against them. The other Nebraska
case cited (Brief, p. 19), Bay State v. Bing, 71 N. W. 311, is
not relevant. The statute merely conferred_ upon the school
superintendent the power to divide the county into school
districts and had nothing to do with the location or removal
of schools. This statute is quoted at page 311 of the report.
Missouri :

Missouri on the other hand has made a dis-

tinction betvveen elementary grades in city and consolidated
districts and in all other districts. See Crow et al. v Consolidated School Dist., Springfield Court of Appeals, 36 S. W.
(2d) 676 for the first type and State ex rei. Miller et al v
Board of Education, 21 S. W. (2d) 645, for the latter. The
first case is the written opinion of an intermediate appellate
court and involves a Missouri statute which was held to confer removing power upon the board. The second case construed a Missouri statute granting the board the power to
remove elementary grades only when the average attendance fell below ten. This also is a distinction the Utah legislature may elect to consider when the school administrators go before it to ask for the power they now endeavor to
usurp. The people of Utah may well be satisfied to grant
plenary power to their boards of education to remove high
schools but not elementary schools. The older students
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
can more or less take care of themselves. But the transportation of infants of five years and upwards by bus over long
distances and into other towns, often in inclement weather,
there to remain away from the care and watchfulness of
their parents for the major portion of the day, is quite another proposition. Utah, like Missouri, may choose to vest
the power to the board in one case and withhold it or repose
it in the local school patrons in the other case. We do not
say the legislature should not grant some powers to boards
of education to remove or consolidate schools under certain
conditions; we merely say they have not done so; and we
emphatically say that the school administrators should go
before the legislature in the democratic American fashion
and ask for such powers as they deem advisable.
Oklahoma:

Some state legislatures have seen fit to

grant the power to remove schools to boards of independent
school districts, and to leave the power with the qualified
electors in common school districts. A case involving the
first statute is Brooks v Shannon, 86 P. (2d) 792, (App.
Brief, p. 20). Here the statute gave the board power "to
maintain and operate a complete public school system of
such character as the board of education shall deem best
suited to the needs of the school district." p. 794. The Oklahoma statute providing that in a common school district
a school could not be removed without a majority vote of
the electors is construed in Goodwin et al v. Union Graded
School District, 74 P. (2d) 601. See also Stayton v. Butchee
et al., 82 P. 726, where a vote of electors was a prerequisite.
North Carolina:
112 S. E. 246, there

In Davenport v Board of Education,

w~re

two districts within the same coun-
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ty. The building in one was burned, the districts were consolidated, and the board transported the high school students
to the other district for instruction.

This was held to be

proper under North Carolina laws. In School Committee v
Board of Education, 120 S. E. 202, although the board was
vested with power to locate a building under the statutes,
it submitted the matter to the referendum of the school
patrons. It will be observed that these two cases primarily
concern the power of the. board to locate school buildings
rather than to remove or relocate them.
North Dakota:

Here the statute provides that the

school house could be removed upon vote of electors when
the proposition was recommended by the board or by peti~
tion of one-third of the voters. Hagstrom v Estherville
School District, 269 N. W. 93.
Texas:

Statute specified that if average daily attend-

ance was 20 or more the board could not abolish school without vote of taxpayers. The attendance was 20 but the board
refused to hire a teacher and a writ of mandamus was properly granted. Chastain v Maudlin et al., 32 S. W. (2d) 235.
South Dakota:

Concerning the two South Dakota

cases cited by defendants, Gollnick v, Luedtke, supra, and
Dahl v Independent School District, 187 N. W. 638 we point
out that the first involves a statute providing for the board
to "s.ell and remove schoolhouses, when lawfully directed by
the electors of the district," and the second deals with the
power of the board to transport students and with the problem of abuse of discretion.
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West Va:

Here there were two provisions of law un-

der which the board operated-one that it had power to establish graded schools, the other that school facilities must
be provided by it within two miles from the residence of
each student. Plaintiff's home was held to be within two
miles of the graded school. State v. Board of Education,
94 S.. E. 500 (Cited by Defs. Brief, p. 14).
Mississippi:

The law of this· state empowered the

school board to make an annual readjustment of the school
districts and buildings. Sellier v. Dedeaux, 99 S. 439. The
board at such annual meeting ordered the school removed
one-half mile from its old location. Defendants' quotation
from this case (Brief, p. 15) must be read in light of this
statute. See the case at page 440.
Indiana:

In Davis v Mendenhall, 49 N. E. 1048, the

statute, as defendants state (Brief, p. 14), vested the school
trustee with discretionary power to abandon a school.
The foregoing texts and cases disclose, inter alia, that:
1. School boards posf?ess only such limited powers as
are conferred by statute and that any reasonable doubt as
to the existence of the power is resolved in favor of the people and against the grant.
2. In almost every reported instance where school
boards have closed or removed schools they have done so
pursuant to express statutory grant of power.
3. · State legislatures have been more reluctant to grant
the power to boards to discontinue elementary and gramSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mar grades and schools in rural districts than to discontinue
upper grades and schools in cities and consolidated districts.
4. The courts have constantly been on guard to hold
school boards within the limits of their powers.
Upon a review of these cases and the Utah statutes we
submit that the trial court was correct in overruling defendants' demurrer to plaintiffs' first cause of action and having
done so it follows of necessity that plaintiffs' demurrer to
defendants' answer to the first cause was properly sustained.

III.

EVEN IF IT BE HELD TI-IAT THE EMERY COUNTY
SCHOOL BOARD HAD PO·WER TO DISCO'NTINUE
AND ABANDON ONE OF I'TIS SCHO~OL.S ITS. ACTIO·N
WITH RESPECT TO THE ELMO SC·HOOL WAS AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION (HEREIN PLAINTIFFS'
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AND ALL SUBSEQUENT PLEADINGS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH.)

Only in the event that the Supreme Court overrules the
trial court as to its holdings with respect to the plaintiffs'
first cause of action will plaintiffs be under necessity of
establishing that the board's action in removing the Elmo
school was arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust. Reported
cases are of less value insofar as this proposition is concerned inasmuch as each case must be decided in light of all
the facts and circumstances involved. We maintain that
our second cause of action does state grounds sufficient to
show an abuse of discretion. Defendants on the other hand
state that our second cause of action in alleging the action
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of the defendants to be discrimnatory, arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to law pleads merely "a stark legal conclusion" and they cite the Missouri case of Corley v. Montgomery, supra, to the effect that such allegations "if unaccompanied by

suppo~ting

facts, would be merely pleading

legal conclusions." (Brief, p. 10). The significant point in
connection with this last mentioned case and with the case
now on appeal is that said allegations in each instance are
accompanied by supporting facts. The Missouri court states
as follows:
"We do not think the case can be disposed of
on the ground that the petition, in alleging that the
attempted discontinuance of the school 'is arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust and oppressive' or is
'unjust unwarranted and illegal' pleads only
legal conclusions. Of course if there were no facts
alleged in the petition showing that the threatened
action was of such character then the above quoted
words would be no pleading but mere conclusions of
law. But these so called 'vituperative epithets' are
not unaccompanied by the statements of facts to
support them. For instance, the petition alleges
that the school district has the money to maintain
the ward school; that great hardships. and inconvenience will ensue to the pupils of said ward school,
in that they are in the primary grades and are physically incapable of going long distances to other
schools; that they will be subjected to the rigors of
the winter season and be exposed to danger from
traffic (no small danger in these days of swift moving automobiles and careless, not to say drunken,
drivers); that property has been purchased on the
faith and on the reliance of the fact that a nearby
school was and would be maintained, and such
property will greatly depreciate if the school is dis~
continued. Legal conclusions do not harm if they
~ppear as the result of or are supported by, pleaded
Issuable facts; but when they are unaccompanied
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by such facts, then they render the petition demurrable." p. 285.
The facts pleaded in our second cause of action have
been set forth concisely in the Abstract (pp. 6-9) and in
Appellants Brief (pp. 1-6). No good purpose will be served
to restate or even summarize them at this point. The allegations of defendants' answer are likewise recited in the
Abstract and Brief. We submit that the action of the
school board in summarily discontinuing the Elmo school
under the circumstances pleaded constitutes a clear abuse of
discretion even if the board had the power to act, which
we deny.
Schools, like churches, came West in the covered wagons
of the pioneers. At Elmo there is a four-room brick school
building of modern design with all necessary furniture and
equipment for the adequate maintenance of a primary and
grammar school to serve Elmo town and adjacent territory.
Elmo town has grown around its school. It is a struggling
community which needs help rather than discouragement
in its effort to maintain satisfactory community life for
adults and children alike. And our Utah law does recognize
the value of schools to adults notwithstanding defendants'
argument in connection with Keever v. Board of Education,
..... G...... , 3 S. E. 886, and People v. Baird, 307 Ill. 503,
139 N. E. 132 (Brief, pp. 16-17). R. S. Utah, 1933, 75-22-1,
provides:
"There shall be a CIVIC center at all public
school buildings and grounds where the citizens of
the respective school districts may engage in supervised recreational activities, and where they may
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tions which in their judgment may appertain to
the educational, political, economic, artistic and
moral interests of the citizens of the commun-

•ty

1

....."

The Elmo people do not ask for a large school. They
ask that they be allowed to educate their small children at
home rather than transport them as far as twenty-five miles
per day to another town, often under hazardous conditions,
there to remain from eight to ten hours each day. Defendants answer that it is in the interest of efficiency and economy to centralize and consolidate. We reply that there are
certain things which are more fundamental than e~ficiency,
economy and centralization, among which are the rights of
parents to watch over and care for their children of tender
years. Nor is the change in the interest of the children,
many of whom are made ill when transported by bus over
such distances and at unusual hours. The need for consolidation of schools and diversification in curricula comes with
the advanced students. This is proven by the enactments
of legislatures throughout the United :States as the cases
cited in this brief attest. Defendants have disregarded this
fact. They attempted to close the Elmo school, it appears
to plaintiffs, because Elmo was the smallest school in the
district and therefore opposition would come from fewer
people than if they had consolidated two or more of their
high schools. Our school houses must not become political
footballs, subject to be kicked from one place to another,
after each local school board election.
We agree, of course, that insofar as the question of
abuse of discretion is concerned each case must be decided
upon its own facts. This proposition is sustained by the
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cases hereinabove cited and by other decisions. In such
cases as Iverson v Union Free High School, supra, and Robb
v. Stone, .•••. Pa......, 146 A. 91, the courts have enjoined
the action of the boards, the court in the first case declaring:
"If such caprice and spitework be approved,
then, when the vicissitudes of politics shall place
the present minority in control of the district meeting, the site may again be changed, and so on, ad
libitum, resulting in a pitiful squandering of public funds and the crucifixion of the cause of education." p. 793.
In other cases such as Brooks v. Shannon, supra, School Committee v. Board of Education, supra, Davis v. Mendenhall
and State v Spokane School Dist., sufficient facts were neither pleaded or proved to warrant the courts interference.
For example in the last mentioned case the school building
was removed a distance of only three blocks and the only
fact established was that the people had built their homes
with reference to the old building.
Even on the theory that the Emery County School
Board possessed the power to abandon a school, it abused
that power under the circumstances pleaded in this action.

IV CO·NCLUSION
In conclusion we submit the following:
1. There is neither express nor implied power vested
in the Emery County School Board to discontinue and abandon the Elmo school. This conclusion we believe is arrived
at fairly and without any semblance of hair-splitting statuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tory interpretation. Here is an occasion where the salutary
rules of statutory construction when applied to a determination of fundamental and far-reaching rights, lead to a just,
fair and inevitable conclusion in favor of the people. But
if there should remain any doubt as to whether or not the
power claimed has been granted, the courts should resolve
that doubt in favor of the people and against their school
servants who have temporarily forgotten that they were
elected to serve the people rather than to rule them.
2. The defendants as school administrators have been
misled by their logic. In the first instance they reason that
the power to discontinue a school must be lodged somewhere,
therefore it is lodged in them. They are correct in the premise but wrong in the conclusion. The power is vested in
the legislature, which may or may not confer it upon others.
In the second instance they reason that inasmuch as the
power is not expressly granted to them that it is necessarily
implied. This reasoning is eqqally fallacious. The power
is not expressly granted to them-it remains with the legislature. In the third instance they reason, or at least did
so at the trial, from the aburdity that unless schools
can be abandoned the board may be compelled to maintain
a school with only one or two pupils and therefore they must
have the power to discontinue the same. If they must have
the power they ~hould go to the legislature and request it.
Plaintiffs with equal show of logic could argue absurdum
that under defendants theory the board in the interest of
efficiency and economy and upon the recommendation of
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction might build
one large school in the center of the district and require
all students from the entire district to attend. The answer
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to this entire line of argument is that power does not root
in arguments absurdum but in legislative grant.
3.

Whether the legislature should grant the power

claimed by defendants, and if so under what terms and
conditions, is not in issue on this appeal. Undoubtedly some
power would be granted to them if the matter were submitted to the legislature.
4. The Utah legislature is in session at this hour. Defendants should be exemplars of the democratic philosophy.
They should be the first to trust its processes and the last
to circumvent them. Let the school officials go before the
representatives of the people and submit their request. If
they do this they will inspire the confidence and trust of
citizens rather than their hatred and suspicion. Are the
school officials afraid to submit their proposal to the free
and open debate of our legislative assembly? In other
states, almost without exception, the school officials have
secured their grant of power in this fashion. See the cases
analyzed in this Brief.
5. Plato taught a philosophy in his Utopia which, writ
large, has come in on the waves of centralized totalitarianism. He advocated that children should be removed from
their parents entirely and be taught by the state. That isn't
American philosophy. Meyer v State of Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042. The trend toward centralization is
met in America by safeguards which our courts are ever
alert to maintain. It is true we are accustomed to send
our children away to college and even to high school but
we are also accustomed to keep our children of tender years
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under our protection and care, especially when we have adequate school facilities for their instruction. These rights
are as precious to the people of Elmo as to the people of
larger communities.. To invade them was discriminatory,
unreasonable, and unjust on the part of defendants.
The trial court was correct in its rulings and its judgment should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
THERALD N. JENSEN,
Attorney for Respondents.
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